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Abstract
Collective reputation and its associated free-rider problem have been invoked to justify state licensing of professions and to explain the incidence of
franchising. We examine the conditions under which it is possible to create a
Pareto-improving collective reputation among groups of heterogeneous producers. If the regulator or franchisor cannot credibly commit to high quality then
a common reputation can be created only if the groups are not too different
and if marginal cost is declining. High cost groups benefit most from forming
a common regime.
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Introduction
Many professions are subject to occupational licensing and quality regulation,

with, in many cases, the standards set by the professional groups themselves. A
common, perhaps majority, view among economists is that such monopoly licensing
arrangements are devices to increase the incomes of the producers at the expense
of the consumers. An alternative view is that if there is asymmetric information
between producer and consumer then setting minimum standards can bring about a
Pareto-improvement by increasing the trust that the client has in the professional:
consumers are more willing to buy the service if there is less risk that the provider is
incompetent or fraudulent. Evidence that, historically, producer incomes rise when
licensing is introduced (see Law and Kim (2005)) is consistent with both hypotheses.
An alternative solution might be for producers to develop individual reputations for
high quality, but this may be inadequate in the cases of occupations, such as those of
physicians or realtors, whose service is purchased infrequently or for which there are
serious consequences if something goes wrong.
This still does not establish a case for state-enforced licensing or regulation. Why
should the professional groups not form voluntary associations which set standards
for their members to adhere to and thereby establish collective reputations3 for the
chosen quality? This private solution allows for the possibility that, alongside a given
professional group, other groups (‘para-professions’) might form parallel associations
which establish their own reputations for a different standard of the same, or a similar,
service. Why should such groups be denied entry?
One possible answer is that there is a reputational externality: the actions of one
group may damage the reputation of another group. Since a given group then does not
bear the full cost of its actions, overall welfare is reduced. Partly on these grounds, in
the UK, physicians have objected to allowing nurses to perform procedures previously
3

An Office of Fair Trading report on the UK estate agency (realtor) market remarked: ‘Effective
codes, those that have high recognition among consumers and are well enforced, should also help to
marginalize rogue traders within a sector. Whole sectors of business can suffer through the behavior
of the rogue element which can damage consumer confidence.’ (OFT (2004), p.112).
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reserved for doctors and lawyers have objected to allowing licensed conveyancers to
sell house conveyancing services. The collective reputation of a profession is a valuable
asset which is endangered by unregulated competitors.4
Collective reputation is also thought to be important in the economics of franchising. According to Rubin (2001, p.228),
“ we must consider what the franchisee is buying when he buys a franchise. The
main item purchased is the trademark of the franchise. This is valuable because the
consumers have a good deal of information about price and quality sold by establishments with a given trademark”.
Furthermore, this gives rise to a reputational externality and associated free-riding
problem. To quote Klein and Saft (1985), who refer to it as “the superhighway
problem”:
“If each franchisee supplies inputs that significantly influence the quality of the
product marketed, and consumers cannot detect the quality of the product before
they purchase it, then each franchisee will have the incentive to cut costs and supply
less than the desired level of product quality. Because the product is standardized,
consumers who receive products of less than anticipated quality will blame the entire
group of retailers using the common name. The individual franchisee directly benefits
from the sales of the lower-quality product, and the other franchisees share in the
losses caused by decreased future demand.”
This effect has been suggested as a determinant of a franchisor’s choice of whether
to franchise a given outlet or to operate it directly. An older literature explained franchise arrangements as a way of raising capital for expansion, but more recent contributions have stressed agency considerations. In a directly-owned outlet the manager
must be monitored, whereas a franchisee’s incentives are provided by the franchise
contract. One would expect to observe franchising when the cost of direct monitor4

A relevant historical case study which is important in the development of state-sponsored auditing requirements is that of the rival associations of credit cooperatives in nineteenth century
Germany (see Guinnane (2003)). Another is the case of the nineteenth century US Buildings and
Loans Associations and their rival group of savings and loans associations known as the ‘nationals’
(see Snowden (2003) and Brumbaugh (1988)). In each case one group of institutions argued that
problems in another group would harm their reputation and business.
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ing is high, when capital requirements are low (otherwise there may be inefficient
risk-bearing) and when there is enough repeat-buying (so as to avoid the free-riding
problem). The evidence on this point is mixed. Brickley and Dark (1987, p.416) find
that firms in industries with relatively little repeat business are more likely to use
franchises. But in their study, the economist’s favorite proxy for lack of repeat business - placement on a major highway - makes an outlet more likely to be a franchise,
when the externality theory predicts the opposite. They are agnostic as to whether
the theory is wrong or the proxy is imperfect; placement on a highway may imply
that the outlet is expensive to monitor directly (Brickley and Dark (1987, p.418)).
In another study, using a better dataset, Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) find that firms
with valuable brand names are less likely to use franchising, supporting the theory
that franchising creates a shirking problem for the brand.5
Similarly, the reputational externality has been used to explain particular features
of observed franchise contracts. For example, Klein and Saft (1985) argue that franchise tying contracts (which force the franchisee to buy inputs from the franchisor
and have generally been regarded with hostility by US courts) are an efficient device
for economizing on quality policing costs which result from the free-riding problem.
The theory of collective reputation has been examined by various authors (see
the section below on related literature) but some aspects of it have not been fully
explored. Firstly, a possible alternative to state licensing of a profession would be
private (or state) certification. Each group (profession or para-profession) would be
free to provide its own chosen quality of the service and each could distinguish itself
from other groups by quality auditing and publicly observable certifying.6 In that
case, why should there be any collective reputation or reputational externality? After
all, as long as consumers can observe the fact that you belong to association A, the
actions of members of association B should be irrelevant to your reputation. One
possible reason is that there is an unobservable common trait which is relevant to the
5

For further discussion of the economics of franchising, see Caves and Murphy (1976), Mathewson
and Winter (1985) and Blair and Lafontaine (2005).
6
Private auditing and certification are observed in a variety of different settings. For example,
securities exchanges monitor their members to prevent fraud, universities create organizations that
certify their standards, and so on.
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choice of quality. In that case, observing quality in one group might tell a consumer
something about likely quality in the other group. Hence, an externality might exist
even if, say, one group is certified and the other is not. We examine below whether,
in this case, a reputational externality can exist and whether it can justify state
licensing.
Secondly, we ask the question: under what conditions is it possible to develop
a common reputation? Two franchised outlets (e.g., two hotels or two restaurants)
may have the same brand name but will not be identical in every way. In many
cases they will have different characteristics which are observable to consumers and
correlated with factors which are conducive to producing high quality. For example,
they may be in different countries,7 one may be rural, the other urban, they may
have different age profiles of staff, etc. It would be rational for consumers to believe
that the two outlets will have the same quality only if the franchisor finds it in
his interest to enforce the same quality in the two outlets, which may or may not
be the case. We aim to isolate factors which are conducive to the development
of collective reputation - one would then expect to observe franchises only where
such factors are present. The same question applies to state or private regulation of
professions: under what conditions would the regulator find it in his interest to enforce
a common quality on heterogeneous members of a profession (or a number of related
professions) when the heterogeneity is at least partly observable to consumers? Where
these conditions do not exist, so that it is not possible to create a Pareto-improving
collective reputation, the supposition must be that the purpose of monopoly licensing
is to restrict competition.
We develop a stylized model, set out in Section 2, which incorporates the main
features common to the above situations. It is a dynamic model, with overlapping
generations of consumers and many long-lived small producers divided into two groups
which are identifiable to consumers (e.g. group A is a profession and group B a paraprofession, or A is rural franchisees, B urban). There is random matching of buyers
and sellers, with no repeat buying for a single producer and only limited repeat buying
7

See Love (1986), pp. 409-410, for an account of difficulties which McDonald’s had with a group
of its franchises in Paris.
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at group level (i.e., a given consumer may buy from A when young and B when old).
High quality is costly to achieve and quality is observed by a consumer only after
purchase. The groups differ in their cost (cq ) of achieving high quality, which is
unobservable by consumers but observable by the regulator/franchisor.
In Section 3 we address the questions above about whether, in the case of two
separately regulated (audited) professions, a reputational externality exists which can
justify state licensing. We find that, not surprisingly, if the two groups are heterogeneous, in the sense that their costs of high quality (cq ) are independent random
variables, then no reputational externality exists when the two groups are separately
regulated - in any equilibrium, a change in the quality of one group has no effect on
a consumer’s belief about the other group. On the other hand, every equilibrium is
inefficient because of the existence of two groups: if there were a single homogeneous
group with a single auditor then full efficiency could be achieved. A reputational
externality does exist if the groups are homogeneous (the cost of high quality is the
same for both groups, i.e., a common trait). Moreover, this gives rise to a worse
equilibrium than in the independent costs case if, in addition, marginal production
costs are declining over the relevant range. On the other hand, there is always an
equilibrium in which, because of the reputational externality, quality and profits are
higher than in the heterogeneous case; furthermore, the bad reputational equilibrium
does not exist if marginal production cost is constant. We conclude from this that
reputational externality is not a strong argument for common regulation. Even in
those cases where it may lead to more inefficiency, the problem could in principle be
solved by co-ordinating on a better equilibrium.
In Section 4 we address the question: when is it possible for heterogeneous groups
(of potential franchisees or of professionals) to develop, through common regulation,
a common reputation for quality? We find that if the regulator/franchisor cannot
publicly commit to high quality then it is possible to do so (and, thus, a common
auditing framework and common brand can bring about a Pareto-improvement) only
if (a) the two groups are not too dissimilar, in the sense that the support of cq is not
too large, and (b) if marginal production costs are declining. Given these conditions,
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a collective reputation can be created. The reason that marginal production costs
must be declining is that, for consumers to believe that, despite heterogeneous cost
of quality, the quality is the same in both groups, quality in group A must, given this
belief, be a strategic complement for quality in group B. If marginal cost is declining
then the fact that quality is high this period in group A, and so, given the consumers’
beliefs, demand at group B will be high next period, means that the marginal benefit
of setting quality high at B this period (through repeat custom for B-members) is
greater than it would be if quality were low at A. Thus, in equilibrium, high quality
at one group is associated with high quality at the other, and similarly in the case of
low quality.
One case in which declining marginal cost may obtain, and so common regulation
is more likely to be appropriate, is the case in which learning-by-doing is important.
Suppose that, because of technological progress, producers need to upgrade their
skills in every period and that this takes place partly through learning-by-doing.
Then, within a given period, marginal cost of producing the first units will be higher
than marginal cost of producing subsequent units, at least up to a point.
The implication of the result is that if (a) and (b) above do not obtain, then
one would not expect to see the firms belong to the same franchise brand (unless
perhaps as a directly-owned outlet), unless there is some commitment device that
the franchisor can employ. A possible example of such a commitment device is the
franchise tying contract mentioned above.
We also show in Section 4 that if the two groups are very different in size then
a common-quality equilibrium does not exist unless the distribution of cq is such
that the larger group, on its own, would have high quality with probability one.
This suggests that if a small independent firm joins an existing homogeneous large
group of franchisees then unless consumers attach probability one to the event of
high quality in the existing group, a common reputation will not be created. On the
other hand, a common reputation can be created among a large number of small firms
with identically, independently distributed cq . As long as the support of cq is not too
large, and the distribution puts enough weight at the lower end, an equilibrium exists
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in which quality is always high - the existence of the low-cost firms creates enough
repeat business to make it worthwhile also to set high quality at the high-cost firms.
In Section 5 we ask whether a high quality (in the sense of lower average value of
cq ) group benefits more than a low quality group, in the case where common regulation
can credibly lead to common standards. We find that in the uniform distribution case
a low-quality group benefits more than a high-quality group.
Related Literature
There is a small theoretical literature on professional regulation. Leland (1979)
analyzed professional licensing as a policy response to a lemons problem. Shaked and
Sutton (1981), in a similar model, analyzed the incentives to form para-professions.
Shapiro (1986) studied a moral hazard model in which licensing is viewed as a requirement for prior investment which alters the incentives to produce high quality.
This differs from our model in a number of ways; for example, sellers in the Shapiro
model are able to build individual reputations. Lizzeri (1999) analyzed the incentives
of private intermediaries who certify quality; the focus of his paper is on strategic
manipulation of information. Grout, Jewitt and Sonderegger (2007) examine some
proposed reforms of the UK legal professions, including various forms of de-licensing.
Their analysis is based on a repeated game and relational contracting approach,
without asymmetric information. None of these papers is concerned with collective
reputation. There are three types of theory of collective reputation in the literature.
Firstly, there is a multiple equilibrium theory (e.g., Arrow (1973)). Secondly, some
papers (e.g., Benabou and Gertner (1993)) derive collective reputation from the existence of a common trait. Both of these phenomena are present in our analysis below
of the case in which the groups have a common value of cq . Thirdly, Tirole (1996) has
a dynamic model, partly adverse selection and partly moral hazard, in which employers can observe an agent’s actions only imperfectly and cannot distinguish him from
earlier generations of agents. If past generations have been corrupt trust in the agent
will be low; this in turn gives the agent the incentive to behave corruptly. In this
way, a reputation for corruption can persist through generations. We are concerned
8

here with a somewhat different question: how the reputations of identifiably different
groups may interact, and how regulation may create collective reputation.

2

The Model

There are two groups, A and B, each consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral producers of unit measure. Each group is homogeneous internally but, as we will explain
below, different from the other group in its cost structure. As outlined above, the
two groups should be thought of as two groups of professionals or of potential franchisees. All producers produce the same good, regardless of their group. They are
not, however, in direct competition with each other: we model each individual producer as a local monopolist who is able to practice perfect price discrimination. Each
producer, in each period, has a continuum of customers, each of whom has inelastic
unit demand. It will be convenient to normalize so that the measure of customers
(for each firm) is 4.
Cost of Investing in Quality
In each period, a typical producer first chooses its quality of production. Quality
can be either high or low; low quality costs zero and high quality costs cqi ≥ 0 where
i ∈ {A, B} is the index of the firm’s group.8 The cost of achieving high quality is a
fixed investment cost, independent of the scale of production, and it must be paid in
each period in which quality is high. For each group i ∈ {A, B}, cqi is drawn at the
beginning of time 1 from an atomless distribution F on [0, a]; cqi is then fixed forever.9
The only difference between the two groups is the value of cqi . Our assumption for
most of the paper is that cqA and cqB are independent, but we also look, in subsection
3.2, at a model in which cqA and cqB are correlated, i.e. there is a common trait.
Alternatively, we could assume that investing cqi has the effect of shifting, for one period, the
cost function for high quality goods downwards, to the level of the cost function for low quality
goods (or lower). The results are qualitatively the same.
9
The model approximates to one in which cq evolves through time according to a Markov process.
See Section 4.
8
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Cost of Production
After selecting quality for the period, the firm produces and sells quantity y ≤ 4
of the good (storage is not possible, so there can be no value in producing quantity
higher than 4). We consider a very simplified cost function: marginal cost is a step
function with at most two values. Either there is constant marginal cost or declining
marginal cost, and, in the latter case, it is positive over some interval and then drops
to zero. Clearly this is a very special type of decreasing marginal cost function, but it
simplifies the arguments and the qualitative results would be the same in the case of
a more general function. The cost function c(y), common to all firms in both groups,
is given by c(y) = cy if y ≤ λ0 and c(y) = cλ0 if y > λ0 , where c > 0 and λ0 > 2. As we
will see, it will turn out to be crucial whether λ0 is above or below 4. If λ0 ≥ 4 then we
effectively have constant marginal cost of production; in the other case, where λ0 < 4,
marginal cost is decreasing in the relevant range - in particular, cost of production
is lower for the second half of total potential production than it is for the first half.
It is convenient to define λ = min[λ0 , 4]. Then λ = λ0 unless we have the constant
marginal cost case, in which event λ = 4.
Matching of Buyers and Sellers
Time is discrete and infinite and labeled t = 1, 2, ... In each period a generation of
new identical risk-neutral consumers is born (we model this generation as a continuum
of measure 2 for each producer) and lives for two periods. In each of these two periods,
a consumer is randomly assigned (with equal probabilities) to a producer; thus, she
has equal probability in each period of meeting an A-producer and a B-producer.
In each of the two periods she buys and consumes at most one unit of the good.
Since arrival of consumers at firms is random, each firm will have, in any period
t ≥ 2, a measure 2 of new-born consumers, a measure 1 of old consumers who were
assigned to an A-producer last period, and a measure 1 of old consumers who were
assigned to a B-producer last period. Because of our assumption that producers are
small the chance of a consumer repeat-purchasing from a given producer is zero. On
the other hand, there is repeat purchasing as far as a particular group is concerned
10

(i.e., a particular customer of an A-producer may meet another A-producer later).
The formulation is intended to represent a situation in which the good is purchased
in a lumpy and infrequent manner, so that repeat purchasing (looked at from the
perspective of a group) is present but limited; furthermore there is potential for
interaction between firms in one group and firms in the other, because consumers
may buy from both groups at different times.
All consumers are identical and in each period they derive utility 0 from a lowquality good and utility v > 0 from a high-quality one. We assume that v > c, which
ensures that there is potentially a positive surplus in any match between a producer
and a consumer. A consumer knows the group identity of a producer with whom she
is matched, but, at the time of buying, she cannot observe the quality of the good
- she discovers this only when she consumes it. The fact that she observes group
identity is intended to model a situation in which, as discussed in the Introduction,
producers have some observable differentiating characteristic which is correlated with
the cost of quality (for example rural versus urban potential franchisees). The quality
(after the fact) of her first-period purchase, if any, and the group affiliation of the
firm or firms with which she has been matched are the only pieces of information
which the consumer has. She cannot observe qualities produced at any firm before
she was born, or, after she is born, at firms with whom she is not matched. Nor can
she observe the costs, cqA and cqB , of achieving high quality.
Pricing
For simplicity, we assume, as noted above, that each firm is a perfect-pricediscriminating local monopolist. This means that, after choosing quality, the firm
observes a given consumer k’s willingness-to-pay vπk , where πk ∈ [0, 1] is the consumer’s belief that the good will be of high quality. The firm’s objective is to maximize
the expected present value of its profit stream, discounted by the factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
Since the firm will not meet its current customers again, it has no interest in charging
k less than vπk . Equally, it cannot charge more since k will get no surplus in the
future, and hence can have no incentive to pay extra in order, say, to learn about
11

quality in the firm’s group. Whatever its chosen quality, the firm will therefore sell, at
price vπk , to any customer k for whom vπk ≥ c, since these trades are certainly profitable. Let the measure of these customers be y 0 . The cost of serving the remaining
customers is C(y 0 ) = max[(λ − y 0 )c, 0]. The firm will therefore sell to the remaining
customers, at their respective valuations, if and only if the resulting revenue is at
least C(y 0 ). In particular, it will sell to all the remaining customers if y 0 ≥ λ, so that
marginal cost at y 0 is zero, and to none of them if λ = 4, which would imply that
marginal cost of serving all customers is c.
Auditing
For a given producer at a given period, each of its current customers’ beliefs about
its quality is independent of the producer’s past and current decisions, because it has
not served any of these customers before. Therefore its profit is independent of its
chosen quality, so it is clear that it will always choose low quality if cqi > 0. Obviously
this outcome is inefficient, and inferior for the producers. A natural response would be
for the group to appoint an auditor, or regulator, to maintain a quality standard for
the group as a whole. We assume therefore that each group has such an auditor. Our
main interest will be in whether heterogeneous groups benefit by having a common
regulatory regime, so we examine two cases: (a) the separate auditors case, in which
each group has its own distinct auditor, and (b) the single auditor case in which the
two groups have the same auditor. An auditor is able, in each period, to choose the
quality level for the whole group. In the single auditor case, the auditor chooses two
levels of quality - one for group A and one for group B - which may or may not be the
same.10 In the franchising interpretation of the model the auditor is the franchisor,
so ‘auditor’ should be understood as ‘auditor or franchisor’. If it turns out that there
is a Pareto-superior equilibrium in which the single auditor chooses uniform quality,
that would suggest that it is credible for the franchisor to establish a uniform quality
over all his franchisees.
10

In principle, the auditor might, if it were possible, prefer to choose different qualities for different
producers within a given group. However, this would not be in his interest.
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In modeling the auditor in this way, what we have in mind is that he is able to
announce to the franchisees or members of the association what the required quality is
and that he has the ability credibly, at zero cost, to enforce the announced standard,
by, for example, random audits and adequate sanctions. There is an issue as to
whether the auditor would have the incentive after the fact to carry out the announced
punishment of a producer who has been found not to meet the required standard. In
this paper, however, we side-step that issue by assuming, in effect, that the auditor
has the ability to commit to the sanction in advance (as in Banerjee, Besley and
Guinnane (1994)). This does not mean, though, that the auditor is able to commit
publicly to choosing a particular quality standard - that is, if he announces to the
consumers that the quality is high, he will nevertheless choose high quality only if
it is in his (and the producers’) interest to do so (in particular, if the cost of high
quality is not too high).
The objective of the auditor is to maximize the unweighted sum of the utilities
(i.e., long-run discounted profits) of the firms which he is auditing. Since consumers
earn zero surplus this is the same objective as a utilitarian social planner would
pursue. Like the producers, but unlike the consumers, the auditor of group i knows
the cost cqi of high quality. An auditor does not observe the quality in a group which
he is not auditing. Although the auditor controls the quality of output, he does not
control pricing or production decisions. As a result an association does not act as
if it were a single firm; in particular, a producer, as noted above, will not offer low
introductory prices in order to allow customers to learn about the quality.
The main features of the model set out here are found in a variety of industries.
Although subject to some state regulation, professionals usually belong to an association that combines some ability to police quality (in the sense of our auditor) with
lobbying, education, and other functions. Lawyers operate this way in the United
States, Britain, and some other countries. In some countries, financial institutions
have private auditing arrangements that are either stricter than or take the place of
state auditing. There are other industries in which producers join a group that provides a common brand and some advertising and sourcing services, but the producers
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remain independent firms, and, most notably for our purposes, agree to common
quality standards and a common dispute resolution procedure. For example, a large
automobile parts wholesaler in the U.S. (NAPA, the National Auto Parts Association)
forms a relationship with what would otherwise be unrelated local automobile repair
shops. In addition to parts, the wholesaler provides common branding and advertising. But the firm stresses that it assures customers that each associated repair shop
meets certain standards of quality and also adheres to a common dispute-resolution
mechanism.11
Strategies
In the separate auditors case, a pure strategy σi for the auditor of group i specifies,
for each possible cost cqi ∈ [0, a], a function σi (cqi ) which maps each history of the form
i
(q1i , q2i , ......., qt−1
) to a choice of quality at date t, qti ∈ {h, l}. In the single auditor
q
) ∈ [0, a]2 , a
case, a pure strategy σ of the auditor specifies, for each pair (cqA , cB
A
B
function σ(cqA , cqB ) mapping each history (q1A , q1B ; q2A , q2B ; .......qt−1
, qt−1
) to a pair of

date-t qualities (qtA , qtB ).
Beliefs
At the point when a customer has to make her first-period decision whether to
buy, a consumer has two possible first-period histories, namely A and B, i.e., all
she knows is the group identity of the producer. When she makes her second-period
buying decision she has twelve possible second-period histories, denoted by (i, q; j)
where i, j ∈ {A, B} and q ∈ {h, l, φ}. For example, (A, h; B) refers to the history
11
In explaining its services to potential members, its website says: “NAPA knows how important
it is for your business to remain independent. We respect that need, and have designed the NAPA
AutoCare Program to meet that need. At the same time, consumers continue to become more
brand loyal, especially when they know the benefits of a nationally recognized brand name. The
NAPA AutoCare Program is not a franchise, nor is it part of a consolidated group... By partnering
with NAPA, you gain all the advantages of NAPA’s experience, knowledge, and hard-won national
reputation. Consumers instantly recognize your business as part of the largest group of top quality
repair centers across the country and can visit your facility already prepared to trust you and your
work. As with most of NAPA’s programs, it is necessary to meet certain requirements. If you, your
team and your business meet these standards, there are many benefits to help you become even
more successful.”
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in which she meets an A-producer in her first period, buys a unit and discovers that
its quality is high, and then meets a B-producer in her second period. (A, φ; B)
represents a history in which she meets an A-producer in the first period and a Bproducer in the second period, and there is no sale in the first period. The beliefs
of a consumer who is born in period t are denoted by πt : {A, B} → [0, 1] and
πet : H → [0, 1] where H is the set of second-period histories. πt (.) and πet (.) give
the probability, conditional on the observed history, that if she buys she will get a
high quality good. We will focus below on steady-state beliefs, that is, beliefs which
are not indexed by t, so that all generations have the same prior belief and the same
updating rule.
Equilibrium
We will examine pure-strategy, perfect Bayesian equilibria with steady-state beliefs. In the separate auditors case such an equilibrium is defined in the following
way. Each generation of consumers has a common belief system (π(A), π(B); πe (.))
and each auditor i ∈ {A, B} has a pure strategy σi such that
A
B
(i) for each i, each t, each history (q1A , q1B ; q2A , q2B ; .......qt−1
, qt−1
) and each cqi ∈ [0, a],

the continuation strategy defined by σi maximizes i’s expected continuation payoff,
given σj (j 6= i) and the belief system (π(A), π(B); πe (.)); and
(ii) the belief system (π(A), π(B); πe (.)) gives the true conditional probabilities of
high quality if the auditors employ the strategy pair (σA , σB ).
Similarly, in the single auditor case, an equilibrium consists of a steady-state belief
system and a pure strategy σ such that, firstly, σ is optimal for the auditor after every
history given the beliefs and, secondly, the beliefs are correct given σ. In order to
avoid complications associated with knife-edge cases, we assume that, if indifferent,
the auditor always chooses high quality.
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3

Equilibrium with Separate Auditors

3.1

Independent Costs
Take an arbitrary pure steady-state equilibrium in the separate auditors case,

with cqA and cqB independent, and consider the problem of the auditor of group i at an
arbitrary date t. He has to decide, knowing cqi , whether or not to set high quality for
this period. This decision has no effect on the prices paid this period by the current
customers of producers in group i since they do not know the current quality at the
time that they buy. Nor will it have any effect on any members of the generations
born at date t + 1 or later, since they do not observe anything dated before their
birth, or the behavior of older buyers. Thirdly, since any date-t customer of group j
will never observe the current quality in group i, the decision will have no effect on
prices paid in the future by these consumers. The only effect will be on i’s repeat
customers: those consumers born at date t who are customers of group i at date t
and will again be customers of group i at date t + 1.
First, note that old customers of group i who were assigned to the other group (j)
in their first period do not believe that there is any correlation between quality at i
this period and quality at j last period. This is because the auditor of group i at time
j
and cqi is independent of cqj .12 That is, πe (j, h; i) = π(i) and
t does not observe cqj or qt−1

πe (j, l; i) = π(i). There are two possibilities to consider: either (a) πe (i, h; i) ≤ πe (i, l; i)
or (b) πe (i, h; i) > πe (i, l; i).
In case (a) the price paid at date t + 1 by the repeat customers will be no higher
if they get high quality at date t than if they get low quality at date t. Clearly, then,
there can be no gain, and there will be a positive cost, from setting high quality at t.
In that case auditor i will set low quality regardless of cqi (except possibly if cqi = 0).
Since the beliefs are the same for all generations, in this equilibrium group i always
has low quality and no sale is ever made (since the customers always place value zero
12

Even if he could observe willingness-to-pay of former j-customers (we have assumed that he
cannot), the above argument would apply at date 2 if he has to choose quality before observing it.
Therefore, by stationarity of beliefs, independence applies at all times.
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on the goods produced by i). Even if there is a deviation and group i producers
produce and sell high-quality goods, the repeat customers will still expect low quality
next period, i.e. πe (i, h; i) = πe (i, l; i) = 0. It is easy to check that this is indeed an
equilibrium.
In case (b) the auditor derives a benefit from the higher price paid by repeat
customers next period if he sets high quality this period. He sets this benefit against
the cost cqi . Clearly there will be a critical value c∗i ≥ 0 such that he sets high quality
if cqi < c∗i and he sets low quality if cqi > c∗i . Since the beliefs are stationary across
generations the auditor faces the same problem each period, so the threshold value
c∗i is independent of history. The steady-state belief of new-borns must therefore be
that the probability of high quality at group i is given by
π(i) = F (c∗i ).
If π(i) is such that there is no possibility of a profitable sale, i.e. if
vF (c∗i ) < c,
then producers will not sell to new-borns and so there will be no repeat customers.
In that case there will be no incentive to choose high quality and so c∗i = 0. This is
the same as the equilibrium which we saw in case (a) above.
Suppose, on the other hand, that new customers do buy (so c∗i > 0). The same
will be true of old customers who were assigned to the other group in their first period
since, as we have seen, they have the same belief about i as new-borns. If a new-born
customer observes high quality at i then she deduces that cqi < c∗i and, by Bayes’ rule,
she must believe that she will again get high quality if assigned to i in her second
period; similarly, if she observes low quality then she will expect low quality next
period. That is, πe (i, h; i) = 1 and πe (i, l; i) = 0.
Next period there will be a measure 3 of sales made at a representative firm (2 to
new-borns and 1 to previous customers of the other group) regardless of this period’s
quality, and a measure 1 of additional repeat customers (paying v) if and only if
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quality this period is high. Therefore the benefit of setting high quality is equal to
δv if λ ≤ 3 and δ(v − c(λ − 3)) if λ > 3. In the first case marginal cost of production
is zero, given the assured sales of 3, so the discounted marginal benefit is δv for each
extra unit sold; in the second case, marginal cost is c until sales reach λ. The auditor’s
strategy in each period must be to set high quality if and only if cqi is less than or
equal to the discounted marginal benefit. That is,
c∗i = min[δv, δ(v − c(λ − 3))].
Since λ ≤ 4 and c < v, c∗i > 0. If this is to be an equilibrium it must be that new
customers place value of at least c on the good. That is,
vF (min[δv, δ(v − c(λ − 3))]) ≥ c.

(1)

There exist, therefore, two possibilities for each group: either there is zero probability
of high quality and the market has collapsed because of low expectations, or else sales
are made (at least to three-quarters of potential) and there is positive probability of
high quality. In total, there are four possible equilibria since beliefs about the two
groups may be asymmetric: e.g., group A may have low quality for sure while group B
has positive probability of high quality. In the low-quality case the auditor achieves
nothing - the equilibrium is the same as if he did not exist. But, as long as (1)
is satisfied, the auditor can improve matters. Our interest will be in equilibria in
which both groups have strictly positive probability of high quality: we call these
positive-quality equilibria.
To summarize, we have the following result.
Proposition 1: If there are separate auditors and independent costs, then a
positive-quality equilibrium exists only if (1) is satisfied. In that case, there is a
unique such equilibrium. In this equilibrium, in every period, quality in group i is
high if and only if cqi ≤ c∗i .
Clearly a zero-quality equilibrium is highly inefficient. The positive-quality equi18

librium, however, will also be inefficient. In the first-best, high quality will be produced in steady-state as long as
4v − λc > cqi

(2)

since the left side of this inequality is the total surplus (gross of cqi ) in the event of
high quality, and there is zero surplus if low quality is produced. In equilibrium, there
is high quality only if
min[δv, δ(v − c(λ − 3))] ≥ cqi

(3)

The left side of (3) is lower than that of (2) for all δ ∈ (0, 1] since v > c. Therefore
quality is too low in equilibrium. Notice that this inefficiency is not caused by any
reputational externality. Since the two groups are independent, and since the customers are able to distinguish one group from the other, a change in the actions of
group A, say, has no effect on the payoffs of group B, since it has no effect on the
beliefs of any customers about the quality of group B. If there is little discounting,
the inefficiency is caused instead by the fact that only a proportion of customers of
a given group will be repeat customers of that group: clearly, if there were a single
group with a single auditor, the auditor, in a positive-quality equilibrium, would set
high quality if and only if (2) were satisfied.
3.2

Common Costs
We assumed above that the cost of high quality in one group is independent of the

cost in the other group and that an auditor does not observe quality in the other group.
As a result there is no reputational externality. We suppose now that the two costs cqA
and cqB are correlated and we ask two questions: (i) is there a reputational externality
in this case (i.e., in equilibrium, would an increase in quality at one group increase
the revenue at the other)? and (ii) if so, is such an equilibrium necessarily worse
than the equilibrium in the independent costs case - in particular, can inefficiency in
this model be traced to the reputational externality? In this case it is plausible that
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the externality would be present because observing quality at group A would tell you
something about cqA which in turn would give you some information about cqB and
so about likely quality at group B. That is, the two groups have a common trait,
namely the common component of cqA and cqB . See Benabou and Gertner (1993) for
an application of a similar idea in macro-economics.
The answer to (i) will be that there are indeed equilibria in which the externality is
present. In particular, if marginal cost is decreasing, there is an equilibrium in which
average quality is lower than in the positive-quality equilibrium in the independent
case: each association has an incentive to lower quality, damaging the interest of
the other group, and reducing the incentive of the other group to invest in high
quality. This lends some plausibility to the claims, referred to in the Introduction,
that considerations of reputation can cause inefficiency which needs to be tackled
by enforcement of industry-wide standards. On the other hand, the answer to (ii)
above is that the reputation effect is not intrinsically bad, because there is another
equilibrium (also exhibiting a reputational externality) in which both groups use the
same cut-off strategies as in the independent cost case. In that equilibrium, therefore,
average quality is the same as it would be without any externality; moreover, profits
are higher than in the independent cost case. Thus reputational externality is not the
main issue, in the sense that even in the cases in which the externality may give rise to
a bad equilibrium, the problem could be solved, at least in principle, by co-ordinating
on a good equilibrium (and since the zero-quality equilibrium always exists, some
reliance on co-ordination is necessary in any case).
For simplicity, we look at the polar case in which there is complete correlation,
i.e., cqA = cqB = cq . Again, cq is assumed to be distributed according to F on [0, a].
We also assume that λ = 3, so that in the independent costs case the critical value
c∗ = δv. As before, we assume that an auditor cannot observe past quality at the
other group, so that equilibria derived from repeated-game considerations (enforcing
high quality by using punishments for low quality) are not feasible.13
13

One might ask why the auditor cannot deduce what the other group’s quality was by observing
the willingness-to-pay of customers who have previously bought from that group. Our assumption
is that only the producers, not the auditor, observe willingness-to-pay.
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Proposition 2: Suppose that there are separate auditors and common costs,
λ = 3 and
vF (δ(v − c)) ≥ c.

(4)

Then there are two positive-quality equilibria. In one equilibrium both groups use cutoff c∗ = δv and in the other they use cut-off δ(v − c). The first equilibrium Paretodominates the second and also Pareto-dominates the positive-quality equilibrium in
the independent costs case. If there are constant marginal costs (λ = 4), or if (1)
holds but not (4), then only the first of the two equilibria exists.
Note that since, in this case, (1) is vF (δv) ≥ c, (4) implies (1).
First, we set out the Pareto-inferior equilibrium; in this equilibrium the reputation
effect leads to low average quality. The strategy of each auditor is to set high quality
if and only if cq ≤ δ(v − c). New-born consumers all buy at price vF (δ(v − c)). ((4)
guarantees that it is profitable to sell to them). A consumer who observes high (low)
quality at one group expects high (low) quality next period at both groups, hence is
willing to pay v (zero). Clearly the beliefs are correct given the strategies because
in equilibrium each group always has the same quality as the other. If cq ≤ δ(v − c)
then i knows that his group will sell at least 3 units for c or more at a representative
firm next period regardless of whether he sets high or low quality this period (2 to
new-borns and 1 to previous j-customers). Marginal production cost will therefore be
zero, so the benefit of high quality is δv, which exceeds cq , hence it is optimal to set
high quality. If, on the other hand, cq > δ(v − c) then i knows that j’s quality is low
and that current customers of j will therefore not buy from i next period. Therefore,
since i’s repeat customers, if any, will take production next period from 2 to 3, the
marginal benefit of high quality this period is only δ(v − c), which is less than cq ,
so it is optimal to set low quality. Hence, the auditor’s strategy is optimal. This
establishes that this is an equilibrium.
However, since (1) is satisfied, there is also an equilibrium in which both groups use
the cut-off strategy defined by c∗ = δv, i.e. the same one as in the independent costs
case. In this equilibrium too, after observing the quality in one group, a consumer
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attaches probability one to the event that the other group produces the same quality.
Thus, if cq ≤ c∗ an auditor knows that next period there will be sales of 3 to newborns and former j-customers plus, if and only if quality is high this period, repeat
purchases of 1. Therefore the benefit of high quality is c∗ , which outweighs the cost.
If cq > c∗ then the benefit is less, so it is optimal to set low quality. As in the
previous equilibrium, a reduction in quality at one group will reduce the payoff at
the other, so the externality is present. However, average quality is the same as in
the positive-quality equilibrium of the previous section. Moreover, average profit is
higher. If costs are independent, the expected trading profit of a producer in group i
(excluding investment cost) is
4vπ I − 3c
where π I = F (δv) is the probability of high quality in the independent case. This is
because demand from new-borns and former j-customers totals 3, paying vπ I , and,
with probability π I , there will be 1 unit of repeat purchases, paying v. In the common
costs case, the corresponding profit is
4vπ I − c(2 + π I ).
As above, demand from new-borns will be 2, paying vπ I , and, with probability π I ,
demand from repeat customers will be 1, paying v. In this case, however, previous
j-customers will only be served with probability π I , though their expected payment
will be the same (vπ I ). Expected profit is therefore higher in the common costs case
because of the saving on production cost when quality is low (expected investment
cost is of course the same in the two cases). The remainder of the proof of Proposition
2 is in the Appendix.
It is clear that the zero-quality equilibrium which we saw above will also still exist
in this setting: if each customer always believes that quality will be low then there
can be no incentive to set high quality. Similarly, there are asymmetric equilibria
in which one group uses the c∗ cut-off strategy and the other always produces low
quality, for all cq , (after a deviation in which a consumer buys from a firm in a group
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which in equilibrium always produces low quality, but observes high quality, assume
that he continues to believe that cq obeys law F ).

4

Equilibrium with a Single Auditor
In this section we return to the model with independent costs and consider the

case in which there is a single auditor or franchisor who, in each period, chooses a
pair of qualities (q A , q B ). All the equilibria that we found in the separate auditors
case will exist in this game too. To see this, notice that if the consumers have a belief
system which assumes that the quality in group i is set entirely as a function of cqi and
so is independent of the quality in group j, then the auditor cannot gain by setting
quality in any other way. A change in the quality in group i will have no effect on the
profits of group-j producers; therefore the auditor must set i’s quality to maximize
i’s profits, and so he faces the same problem as a separate auditor would. If there are
constant marginal costs then these are the only equilibria, as the next Proposition
shows.
Proposition 3: Suppose that there is a single auditor, independent costs of
investment, and constant marginal costs. Then the set of equilibria is the same as in
the separate auditors case.
Proof:

Consider an arbitrary equilibrium and arbitrary date t. There is a

measure 1 of customers of group i who will again be customers of group i next period,
giving a profit next period of max[v πe (i, .; i)−c, 0], where πe (.) are beliefs corresponding
to the equilibrium. There is also a measure 1 of i-customers who will be customers
of group j next period, giving a profit next period of max[v πe (i, .; j) − c, 0]. These
are the only consumers whose behavior will be affected by the quality in group i at t.
Therefore the auditor’s expected payoff if he sets high quality at group i at t differs
from his expected payoff if he sets low quality by the amount
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δ[max[v πe (i, h; i) − c, 0] + max[v πe (i, h; j) − c, 0] − max[v πe (i, l; i) − c, 0]
−max[v πe (i, l; j) − c, 0]] − cqi .
He sets high quality if and only if this expression is non-negative. But, since the
expression is independent of quality in group j, the beliefs πe (.) must assume independence, and the equilibrium must be one of the separate-auditors equilibria. QED.
In other words, regardless of the quality in group j, and regardless of the inference
that consumers draw from observing this quality, the marginal cost of production will
be the same (c) and hence the net benefit gained, via repeat customers, from investing
in high quality will be the same. Therefore the trade-off between high and low quality
in group i is independent of quality in group j. But that means that consumers must
believe that there is no correlation between the qualities in the two groups. Even
though there is only one auditor/franchisor setting quality for all the producers he
cannot credibly announce that there is a common standard for everyone.
If, on the other hand, there are decreasing marginal costs (λ < 4) then a complementarity may endogenously arise between q A and q B . For simplicity, we will consider
the case14 λ = 3. If group A’s quality is high and if, as a result, group A’s customers
are willing to trade in their second period with group B producers, then B producers
have more to gain from high quality (δv) than they would if A’s quality were low and
so demand for B’s products were lower (the benefit then would be δ(v − c)). So, if
consumers believe that the qualities are correlated, it will be profitable to make them
so, which in turn justifies the belief.
We will assume that the following two inequalities apply:
v ≥ 2c

(5)

14
For other values of λ, qualitatively similar equilibria will obtain, for different ranges of parameter
values.
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and
2δv ≥ a.

(6)

If (5) and (6) are satisfied then there exists an equilibrium in which, for every pair
(cqA , cqB ) there is a common standard for the two groups.
Proposition 4: Suppose that there is a single auditor, independent costs of
investment, and λ = 3, hence marginal costs are decreasing. Suppose also that (1), (5)
and (6) hold. Then there is an equilibrium in which both groups always have the same
quality: quality is high if and only if
cqA + cqB
≤ δ(2v − c).
2

(7)

This equilibrium Pareto-dominates the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium and has higher average
quality.
Proof: In the equilibrium, the auditor sets high quality in both groups if average
cost of investment is below δ(2v − c) and otherwise sets low quality in both. Let the
probability of the event of high quality be denoted by π̂. Each new generation has
belief π(A) = π(B) = π̂. The beliefs of old generations are given by
πe (i, h; i) = πe (i, h; j) = 1
and
πe (i, l; i) = πe (i, l; j) = 0
for i, j ∈ {A, B}. That is, if a consumer observes high quality she believes that next
period the quality at both groups will be high; similarly, if she observes low quality
she believes it will be low next period at both groups. Clearly the beliefs are correct,
given the auditor’s strategy.
Each new-born generation buys, since vπ̂ ≥ c. To see this, note that if cqA <
2δ(v − c) then, since, by (6), cqB ≤ 2δv, it must be that (7) is satisfied and so quality
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is high. Therefore
π̂ ≥ pr(cqA ≤ 2δ(v − c))
and so
π̂ ≥ F (2δ(v − c).
By (1), vF (δv) ≥ c. Combining with (5) gives vπ̂ ≥ c. This also establishes that
π̂ > F (c∗ ), so that quality is higher in the common-quality equilibrium.
It remains to check that the auditor’s strategy is optimal given the consumers’
beliefs. Clearly the auditor’s maximization problem is stationary and it suffices to
consider the effect of changing quality in one period on the profits in the following
period. Let the difference between next period’s discounted profit and the current
cost of quality be denoted by µ(q A , q B ). The auditor has four possible choices for
(q A , q B ): (h, h), (h, l), (l, h) and (l, l). µ is given as follows.
µ(h, h) = −cqA − cqB + 2δ[2v + 2vπ̂ − 3c],
µ(h, l) = −cqA + 2δ[v + 2vπ̂ − 3c],
µ(l, h) = −cqB + 2δ[v + 2vπ̂ − 3c],
µ(l, l) = 2δ[2vπ̂ − 2c].
For example, if quality is high at both groups, each firm will make 2v from second
period consumers, and 2vπ̂ from first-period consumers. If quality is high only at A,
then each firm will make 2vπ̂ from first-period consumers and v from consumers who
bought at A in their first period. If (7) is satisfied then (h, h) is better than (l, l),
and vice versa if (7) is not satisfied. (l, h) is optimal only if
cqA ≥ 2δv,
which violates (6). Therefore (l, h) is never optimal. Similarly, neither is (h, l). This
shows that the auditor’s strategy is optimal given the beliefs of consumers.
To show that the common-quality equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the c∗ -cutoff
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equilibrium, we consider the event that the auditor deviates by playing the c∗ -cutoff
strategy and we show that this deviation gives him a higher expected payoff than
the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium does. Since the deviation by definition is inferior to the
equilibrium strategy, this shows that the auditor is better off in the former equilibrium,
and hence that it is Pareto-superior. If he deviates, his expected investment cost is the
same as in the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium and his expected revenue from a repeat customer
is also the same (vF (c∗ )). Like a repeat customer, an old customer who has switched
groups will pay v with probability F (c∗ ) and zero with probability 1 − F (c∗ ), giving
the same expected revenue as in the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium (when she pays vF (c∗ ) for
sure). The only differences are (i) that in the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium, customers of
the latter type are served for sure rather than with probability F (c∗ ) hence expected
production cost is higher, and (ii) new-borns pay vF (c∗ ) rather than vπ̂ > vF (c∗ ).
Hence the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium gives lower expected payoff to the auditor. QED.
The conclusion is that, even though there is no reputational externality when the
groups are separately audited, it is possible to maintain higher quality and higher
expected payoff if the groups merge into a single association as long as two conditions
are satisfied: firstly, there is some element of fixed cost in production and, secondly,
the potential difference between the two groups is not too great (a is not too high, as
guaranteed by inequality (6)). The two conditions are required because it has to be
credible that the auditor will set a common standard. This cannot be credible if the
two groups are too different from each other or if there is no complementarity between
the two qualities, given the belief that there is a common standard. Intuitively, the
reason that the common-standard equilibrium is superior to the separate-auditors
equilibrium is that, assuming that the common standard is credible, the market reach
of the association is larger and, as a result, the degree of potential repeat purchasing
is increased. This improves incentives to set high quality.
If (6) is not satisfied (a > 2δv) then the common-quality equilibrium cannot exist.
Suppose that the consumers believe that quality is always the same at the two groups.
If cqA > 2δv and cqB < 2δ(v−c) then the auditor will want to set high quality at B since
µ(h, h) > µ(h, l) and µ(l, h) > µ(l, l), and low quality at A, since µ(l, h) > µ(h, h)
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and µ(l, l) > µ(h, l). Therefore there can be no equilibrium of this kind. There may,
however, still be a c∗ -cutoff equilibrium. Suppose that 2δv < a < δv 2 /c ((5) ensures
that this interval is non-empty). Suppose also that F (.) is the uniform distribution.
In that case inequality (1) is δv 2 /a ≥ c, which is satisfied, so the c∗ -cutoff equilibrium
exists by Proposition 1.
We have assumed that the quality cost cq is fixed forever at the initial period,
while our welfare analysis has implicitly assumed that assessments are made before
cq is chosen. What we have in mind is that the model above is an approximation to
one in which cq evolves slowly while the discount factor is high. Suppose that each cqi
independently follows a Markov process - in each period there is a small probability
of a new draw from F . It can be shown that in that case the equilibria will be close
to those of the model set out above. In a common-standard equilibrium a consumer’s
willingness-to-pay in her second period after buying a high-quality good in her first
period will be slightly less than v because of the possibility of a drop in the average
value of cq ; therefore the marginal benefit of setting high quality is slightly changed,
which in turn brings about a small change in the critical value. In other respects
the equilibrium is unchanged. In such a model, with a high degree of patience, it is
appropriate to use ex ante assessments to evaluate, e.g., whether it is in the interest
of two groups to merge, even if they know their current values of cq .
Asymmetric Group Sizes
Until now we have assumed there are two equal-sized groups. Now we consider the
case in which one group is much larger than the other. Suppose, for example, that a
franchisor with an existing homogeneous group of franchisees is considering whether
to admit a new, independent, firm, or small group of firms, to the organization. Would
a common standard then be credible? It turns out that the answer is no, unless the
existing group is certain to have high quality. The reason is that in the event that the
small group has a very low cost of quality, but the large one does not (i.e., would have
low quality without the new members), the franchisor would choose high quality for
the small group and low for the large one, which implies that a belief in a common
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quality is not sustainable.
We assume, as above, that (1), (5) and (6) hold and that λ = 3. The two groups
have the same distribution of investment cost cqi , with support [0, a]. Group A now
consists of a continuum of firms of measure α < 0.5, instead of measure 1; group B
has a continuum of firms of measure 1 − α. As before, each firm has, in each period,
a continuum of new customers of measure 2; of these, 2α go in their second period to
a firm in group A and 2(1 − α) go to a firm in group B. Thus, if α is close to zero (as
we will assume) most customers, whether at group A or group B in their first period,
will go to group B in their second.
Consider first the case in which the two groups are separately audited. In a
positive-quality equilibrium, A’s demand in the absence of repeat purchasers would
be 2 + 2(1 − α) > λ, so marginal cost would be zero. Therefore A optimally sets high
quality if cqA ≤ 2αδv. B’s demand in the absence of repeat purchasers is 2 + 2α < λ
and he sets high quality if cqB ≤ δ[2(1−α)v −(λ−2(1−α))c] = δ[2(1−α)v −(1−2α)c].
If α is close to zero, then A’s critical value 2αδv is also close to zero, so this cannot
be an equilibrium (new customers would not pay enough to cover production cost).
Therefore the only equilibrium is the zero-quality one, in which A producers earn
zero profit. In group B, the critical value is approximately δ(2v − c); by (1), new
customers will be willing to pay more than c, so the positive-quality equilibrium does
exist for this group. When α is close to zero this equilibrium is approximately the
same, for B, as the positive-quality equilibrium of B on its own.
Suppose now that the two groups form a single association. Assuming that consumers believe quality is the same at the two groups, and defining µ(., .) as above, we
have
µ(h, h) = −αcqA − (1 − α)cqB + δ[2vπ̂ − 2c + 2v − c],
µ(h, l) = −αcqA + δ[2vπ̂ − 2c + 2αv − 2αc],
µ(l, h) = −(1 − α)cqB + δ[2vπ̂ − 2c + 2(1 − α)v − c],
µ(l, l) = δ[2vπ̂ − 2c].
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By (6), cqA < 2δv, so (l, h) is inferior to (h, h). Suppose that cqA < 2δ(v − c) and cqB >
δ(2v − c). Then, for small α, µ(h, h) < µ(h, l) and µ(h, l) > µ(l, l). Therefore (h, l) is
optimal, contradicting the consumers’ belief in a common quality. This shows that the
common-standard equilibrium cannot exist unless a ≤ δ(2v − c), in which case group
B is certain to set high quality in the separate auditors case. This therefore gives a
second sense in which the franchisees have to be similar for a collective reputation to
develop: they should not be both independent and unbalanced in importance.
Proposition 5: Suppose that there is a single auditor, independent costs of
investment, λ = 3, and that (1), (5) and (6) hold. Suppose also that the sizes of A
and B are respectively α and 1 − α. If a ≤ δ(2v − c) then, for any sufficiently small α,
there is an equilibrium in which both groups always have high quality; if a > δ(2v − c)
then, for any sufficiently small α, no common-quality equilibrium exists.
Many Small Groups
Suppose now that the organization consists of many small firms of the same size
and with identical, independent distributions of quality cost. There are k firms, each
of measure α, with kα = 1. For comparability with the analysis above, we continue to
assume that the measure of new customers at each firm is 2, so that for any {i, j}ki,j=1
firm i has 2α old customers who were customers of firm j in the previous period. As
before, let λ = 3.
Suppose that the consumers believe that quality is the same at all firms. Suppose
also that the auditor sets quality high at at least half of the k firms and consider
his decision at one of the remaining firms, i. The cost of high quality is αcqi . Next
period, since at least half of second-period customers at a typical firm will choose to
buy, marginal cost of serving a previous customer of i will be zero. Therefore the
marginal benefit of setting quality high at i is 2αδv. By (6), cqi < 2δv, so high quality
is optimal. Therefore, if the auditor sets quality high at half of the firms then he
must also set quality high at the other half.
If fewer than half of the firms have high quality then the marginal benefit of high
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quality at i is 2αδ(v − c), so high quality is optimal at i if cqi < 2δ(v − c). For the
limiting case as α goes to zero, what matters therefore is whether F [2δ(v −c)] is above
or below 0.5. If F [2δ(v − c)] < 0.5 then no common-quality equilibrium can exist,
since it would be optimal to set high quality at a proportion F [2δ(v − c)] of firms,
but not at any others. If F [2δ(v − c)] > 0.5 then a common-quality equilibrium does
exist; moreover, quality is always high in this equilibrium. The existence of a critical
measure of low-cost firms has the effect, via the decreasing marginal cost, of dragging
up the quality of all the other firms.

5

Asymmetric Cost Distributions
In this section we examine what happens if the distribution of investment costs

differs between the two groups. The main question we ask is: who benefits most from
forming a merged association, a relatively high quality group (i.e., one with a low
expected cost of achieving high quality) or a relatively low quality group? One theory
might be that the high quality group gains most because, when the two groups are
separately audited, the low quality group exploits the reputation of the high quality
group, damaging the latter’s interest. We have seen, however, that, if costs are
independent, there is no collective reputation phenomenon, so this argument cannot
apply. A second theory would be that the high quality group gains most because,
when the two groups are jointly audited, the low quality group is burdened with
excessive cost of investment. We show that, on the contrary, if the cost distributions
are uniform, the low quality group benefits most from merger.
First, we consider general distributions of cost and show that, in the separate
auditors case, the high quality group has higher expected profit. More precisely, if
the distribution of B’s cost first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of A’s
cost, then A’s expected equilibrium profit is higher.
Suppose that cqA is distributed according to c.d.f. FA (.) on the interval [0, a] and
cqB is distributed according to FB (.) on [0, b]. cqA and cqB are independent. Suppose
also that FB (.) first-order stochastically dominates FA (.), that is, b ≥ a and FB (x) ≤
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FA (x) for all x ∈ [0, b]. Thus, B is a relatively low quality group in the sense that its
cost of obtaining high quality tends to be higher.
We consider, for simplicity, the case λ ≤ 3 and we suppose that parameters are
such that the positive-quality equilibrium exists in the separate-auditors case. That
is, vFi (δv) ≥ c for i = A, B. We assume also that a > δv, so that, in equilibrium,
there is strictly positive probability of low quality in each group. In this equilibrium,
auditor i = A, B sets high quality if and only if cqi ≤ δv. The expected payoff in each
period of group i (in ex ante terms, i.e. before cqi is known), denoted ΓSi , is
ΓSi

= 4vFi (δv) − λc −

Z δv
0

cq dFi (cq ).

Therefore group A’s payoff exceeds group B’s payoff if and only if
4v(FA (δv) − FB (δv)) >

Z δv
0

cq dFA (cq ) −

Z δv
0

cq dFB (cq ).

(8)

Proposition 6: If there are separate auditors and independent costs of investment, and FB (.) first-order stochastically dominates FA (.), then A has a higher ex
ante expected payoff in the positive-quality equilibrium than B.
Proof: Using integration by parts,
Z δv
0

cq dF (cq ) = δvF (cq ) −

Z δv
0

F (cq )dcq .

Therefore (8) is true if and only if
(4 − δ)v[FA (δv) − FB (δv)] >

Z δv
0

[FB (cq ) − FA (cq )]dcq .

By first-order stochastic dominance, the left-hand-side of this inequality is positive
and the right-hand-side is negative. QED.
Now we consider the common-quality equilibrium when there is a single auditor.
As in section 4 we limit ourselves to the case λ = 3, and we assume that (1) and (5)
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hold and that (6) holds for both distributions: that is, 2δv ≥ b. Denoting 2δ(2v − c)
by z, the quality is high in both groups if and only if cqA + cqB ≤ z.
In this equilibrium, both groups have the same expected revenue and the same
expected cost of production. Therefore expected payoff differs only inasmuch as
expected investment cost differs. Let ΓJi denote the per-period payoff for group i in
this equilibrium (J standing for ‘joint’). Then the difference between the two groups’
expected payoffs is given by
ΓJA

−

ΓJB

=(

Z z−a
0

q

c dFB (c ) +

Z z−b

(

q

0

q

q

Z b
z−a

c dFA (c ) +

cq FA (z − cq )dFB (cq ))−

Z a
z−b

cq FB (z − cq )dFA (cq ))

since, for example, given cost realization cq , B will incur cost cq for sure if cq < z − a
and will incur it with probability FA (z − cq ) otherwise.
Suppose now that FA (.) is the uniform distribution on [0, a] and FB (.) the uniform
distribution on [0, b]. Then, after some calculation, we have
ΓJA

−

ΓJB

(a − b)[(a + b − z)2 − ab]
=
2ab

and
ΓSA − ΓSB =

δv 2 (b − a)(8 − δ)
.
2ab

Group B, the inefficient group, benefits more than group A from merger if ΓJA − ΓJB <
ΓSA − ΓSB . Since a < b, (ΓJA − ΓJB ) − (ΓSA − ΓSB ) has the opposite sign to
(a + b − z)2 − ab + δv 2 (8 − δ),
which, since δv > b/2 and a < 2δv, is positive. This establishes
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Proposition 7: A low-quality group has most to gain from common auditing.
That is, if FA (.) and FB (.) are independently uniform on [0, a] and [0, b] respectively,
where a < b, then B gains more from merging than A does, assuming the merged
association has the common quality equilibrium.

6

Concluding Remarks
There are many settings in which disparate producers may want to establish a

common reputation. We have shown in this paper that the possibility of doing so
depends on certain factors, including the nature of the production function, in ways
which have not previously been noted in the literature. These factors in turn can be
expected to be relevant to the explanation of, for example, the extent and composition
of franchise organizations and professional groups.
One common complaint about self-regulating professions is that they do not actually enforce properly their proclaimed standards. If so, that may be because an
auditor who identifies with and is drawn from the profession may not, after an abuse,
have the incentive to carry out the required punishment. This issue did not arise
in this paper because we assumed that an auditor can commit to enforce his chosen quality. Suppose, however, that the auditor lacks this commitment power. This
would raise questions about the optimal balance between self-regulation and state
regulation which we hope to address in subsequent work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: First we show that the two equilibria described
are the only positive-quality equilibria. If, in some equilibrium, there is positive
probability of high quality at both groups then new-borns must buy at both groups
(otherwise there would be no incentive to set high quality). If cq is such that previous
customers of group j will buy from group i then i’s optimal cut-off is δv, while, if not,
it is δ(v − c). Therefore there are only two possible equilibrium cut-offs. To see that
both groups must use the same cut-off, suppose, for definiteness, that A uses δv and
B uses δ(v − c). New-borns must be willing to buy from B (for the reason above).
Thus, if A’s quality is high, A-customers must be willing to buy in their second period
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from B because they have a higher expectation of B’s quality than new-borns, their
conditional expectation of cq being lower. So, if cq ≤ δv, B’s demand without repeat
customers is 3, which means that B’s benefit of setting high quality is δv, which is a
contradiction.
If (4) does not hold then clearly the δ(v − c) cut-off strategies do not form an
equilibrium. If there are constant marginal costs then the marginal profit is always
δ(v − c) so the δv cut-off equilibrium does not exist.
Finally, we need to show that the δv cut-off equilibrium Pareto-dominates the
δ(v −c) cut-off equilibrium. If, in the δv equilibrium, one auditor unilaterally deviates
and chooses cut-off δ(v − c), his expected payoff is
3vF (δv) + vF (δ(v − c)) − 2c − F (δv)c − E(cq |cq ≤ δ(v − c)).

(9)

His expected payoff in the δ(v − c) cut-off equilibrium is
4vF (δ(v − c)) − 2c − F (δ(v − c))c − E(cq |cq ≤ δ(v − c)).

(10)

Since (10) exceeds (11), the Proposition is proved. QED.
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